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Security Council

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17 August 2007
English
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Letter dated 13 August 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith two letters from the President of the African Union Commission, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konaré, on the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia and United Nations support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (see annexes).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

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Annex I

Letter dated 31 July 2007 from the President of the African Union Commission addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: French]

I would like to express the full satisfaction of the African Union at the unanimous adoption by the United Nations Security Council of resolution 1769 (2007), which authorizes the deployment of the African Union/United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

The adoption of resolution 1769 (2007) crowns months of relentless joint efforts and work and marks a turning point in the search for a lasting solution to the Darfur conflict. I am convinced that the deployment of UNAMID will consolidate the results which the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has achieved, in spite of the serious financial and logistical constraints that have adversely affected operations, and will facilitate the restoration of a lasting peace and reconciliation in Darfur. It is also important to note that resolution 1769 (2007) was adopted in the context of the revitalization of the political process in Darfur.

The African Union and the United Nations should now further intensify their efforts to ensure the deployment of UNAMID in the shortest time frame possible. In this respect, I would like to assure you of the commitment of the African Union to continue working closely with the United Nations so that all necessary measures are taken in a timely manner.

The arrangements agreed on by the African Union and the United Nations concerning the deployment of UNAMID undoubtedly represent an innovation that should serve as a source of inspiration for strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. In other words, their aim is to allow the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations to take on their full meaning and to allow us to rise to the challenge of peace and security in Africa. We will certainly have the opportunity to consider the question further during the months to come within the framework of the follow-up to the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 28 March 2007 on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security.

I cannot conclude without conveying our sincere gratitude to the United Nations, you personally and your predecessor, Kofi Annan, for the constant support provided to the African Union in carrying out the mission in Darfur on behalf of the international community.

(Signed) Alpha Oumar **Konaré**
Chairperson

Annex II

Letter dated 4 August 2007 from the President of the African Union Commission addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English]

The situation in Somalia is a matter of utmost concern to the African Union. On 18 July 2007, our Peace and Security Council met to review the developments in that country, and decided, among other things, to renew the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for another period of six months. I am forwarding, herewith, the communiqué adopted by the Peace and Security Council for your information.

This decision by the Peace and Security Council came at a time of renewed efforts regarding the political process in Somalia, as shown by the opening, a few weeks ago, in Mogadishu, of the National Reconciliation Congress. While many and daunting challenges lie ahead, there is no doubt that the opening of the Congress constitutes a significant step towards an all-inclusive and genuine reconciliation process, which deserves the full support of the international community.

When, towards the end of 2006, the Transitional Federal Government returned to Mogadishu and regained control of large parts of the country, the international community as a whole agreed that this represented an unprecedented opportunity to restore structures of governance in the country, as well as to bring to a definite end the violence that Somalia witnessed for more than a decade and the untold suffering inflicted on its people. The decision by the Peace and Security Council, in January 2007, to authorize the deployment of AMISOM was aimed at seizing that unique opportunity. The extension of the mandate of the Mission is an act of faith in the determination of the people of Somalia to open a new chapter in the history of their country and a testimony of our conviction that the objective referred to above can be achieved.

Due to the serious financial and logistical constraints facing the African Union, we have to date been able to deploy only two battalions out of the nine authorized by the Peace and Security Council. Against this background, and given the volatile security situation on the ground, the performance of the Ugandan troops is clearly remarkable. We intend to take advantage of the coming weeks to mobilize additional support for AMISOM, accelerate the deployment of the already pledged Burundian, Ghanaian and Nigerian contingents, and identify other troop-contributing countries in order to reach, as soon as possible, the authorized strength of the Mission.

While these efforts are under way, I would like to, once again, stress the need for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia that would take over AMISOM and support the long-term stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia. Indeed, the task at hand goes far beyond the capacity of the African Union; it requires urgent action by the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Should the international community fail to act swiftly in support of the ongoing process, there is a real risk that the modest progress already achieved in Somalia may be reversed, with far-reaching regional implications and further

suffering for the Somali people. Clearly, this is a prospect that the international community should avoid at all cost.

As you rightly pointed out in your last report on Somalia, a United Nations operation would only succeed if it is deployed in support of a political process, not as a substitution for one. Now that the Somalis have embarked on such a process within the framework of the National Reconciliation Congress, it is the duty of the international community to encourage them and provide further support in order to enhance the prospects of lasting peace and reconciliation. It is our hope that the United Nations will look at the situation with the required flexibility, bearing in mind that the political and peacekeeping aspects are closely interrelated and mutually reinforcing.

In the meantime, and given that the African Union is acting on behalf of the larger international community in Somalia, it is crucial that AMISOM receive all the support it needs to enable it to create, in the coming months, as conducive conditions as possible for the speedy deployment of a United Nations operation. It is in this context that the Peace and Security Council, in its communiqué, called on the United Nations, pending a decision of the Security Council authorizing the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia, to put in place, in consultation with the Commission of the African Union, a financial, logistical and technical support package for AMISOM, within the context of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. To this end, therefore, I propose that experts from the African Union Commission and the United Nations Secretariat meet as soon as possible in Addis Ababa to work out the details of such a package, which would then be submitted to the relevant United Nations organs for consideration.

I would like to seize this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to you and the United Nations for the support already rendered, through the deployment of several planning and other staff to support the AMISOM Strategic, Planning and Management Unit. I am confident that our joint and determined efforts will contribute decisively to the restoration of enduring peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

(*Signed*) Alpha Oumar **Konaré**

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Security Council

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21 August 2007
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Letter dated 13 August 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

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I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

* Reissued for technical reasons.

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Annex

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[Original: English]

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(*Signed*) Alpha Oumar **Konaré**

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Security Council

Distr.: General
20 August 2007

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Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1590 (2005), in which the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed of progress in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The report covers the period since my 17 April 2007 report (S/2007/213), including references to recent developments with regard to Darfur.

II. Implementation of the major elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

2. During the period under review, the parties held intensive consultations aimed at resolving outstanding differences over implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. According to representatives of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the National Congress Party (NCP), these consultations resulted in progress on key issues, including the sensitive question of oil contracts. However, the parties have not yet settled their differences on the issue of Abyei, despite indications in April and May of significant progress on the issue. Nor were any significant advances made in the area of legislation related to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In the meantime, the parties, with the assistance of UNMIS, continued to work towards the full redeployment and verification of forces, in accordance with the Agreement; however, the important deadline of 9 July 2007, intended to mark the full redeployment of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to the north of the 1956 boundary line, was not met.

Security

3. The overall security situation remained calm as the 9 July 2007 deadline (see para. 4 below) approached, with no clashes associated with the redeployment. However, the security situation in the ceasefire zone deteriorated slightly during the reporting period, with localized violence, particularly in Southern Kordofan, Eastern Equatoria and parts of Upper Nile. Most incidents appeared to be related to clashes over natural resources, or were due to ill-disciplined soldiers or banditry. In the most serious incident of violence, which took place on 5 May 2007, armed members of the Toposa tribe attacked unarmed members of the Didinga tribe in Lauro,

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Eastern Equatoria, killing 54 people, mostly women, and stealing 800 head of cattle as well as agricultural equipment. In Equatoria, insecurity was compounded by the reported westward movement of Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) forces, presumably towards their designated assembly areas.

4. A major focus of the Mission's efforts during the reporting period was the monitoring of the redeployment by the Sudanese Armed Forces to the north of the 1 January 1956 border between northern and southern Sudan, which was to have been completed by 9 July 2007. While much of the redeployment was carried out as required, the deadline was not met in full. SAF acknowledge that some 3,600 of their troops remain in southern Sudan, mainly in small concentrations in Upper Nile State, but claim that these forces are required to protect the oilfields pending full deployment of Joint Integrated Units. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) does not agree with this argument. Meanwhile, some southern civilian sources including the Governor of Unity State continue to assert that much larger numbers of SAF remain in the south. These issues are being addressed by the Joint Defence Board, which according to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement has the responsibility to coordinate between the two forces, command the Joint Integrated Units and address threats to the security of the oil installations.

5. As of 17 July 2007, both parties and UNMIS agreed that 66 per cent of the required reduction of SAF forces had been carried out (32,221 of an estimated 46,403 troops). This figure includes those redeployed north of the 1 January 1956 boundary (57 per cent) and those verified as redeployed to Joint Integrated Units, which are to be composed of personnel from both parties in the south (9 per cent). In addition, there have been some important symbolic steps, including the handover on 9 July of the SAF headquarters at Malakal to the local Joint Integrated Unit, commanded by SPLA.

6. However, the status of some SAF personnel in the south remains to be finalized. These troops include some 2,800 Joint Integrated Unit elements undergoing re-verification by UNMIS (6 per cent) as well as some 8,900 troops (19 per cent) "voluntarily demobilized" by SAF under article 19 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement security protocol. SPLA argues that these demobilized groups still receive salaries from SAF, and should therefore be considered active soldiers until they go through the formal programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The Ceasefire Political Commission has determined that SAF will complete its payments to these forces by the end of 2007.

7. Both parties have taken steps to address the status of other armed groups. In May, SAF facilitated unilateral disarmament of SAF-aligned other armed group members in southern Sudan, collecting weapons in exchange for substantial payments. However, the exercise took place outside the framework of the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration institutions, raising concerns about the lack of planning for reintegration of ex-combatants. While only 827 former combatants were formally disarmed in this process, SAF declared in a ceremony in Khartoum on 24 June that all SAF-aligned other armed groups in southern Sudan had been officially dissolved, and any remaining militiamen should henceforth be considered illegal. However, SPLA maintains that SAF should share responsibility for the remaining ex-militiamen pending their full reintegration into society.

8. For its part, SPLA has continued to make progress in the formal integration of those militias that had aligned themselves to SPLA under the 2006 Juba Declaration. In May, Salva Kiir, President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Commander-in-Chief of SPLA, announced that SPLA would formally incorporate some 34,000 combatants of former other armed groups, who used to be part of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF). The full integration of SSDF and the overall restructuring of SPLA into a professional army remains one of the key challenges ahead.

9. The formation of Joint Integrated Units is significantly behind schedule. The number of troops assembled for inclusion into the Joint Integrated Units has reached 77 per cent of the expected total. However, the SPLA and SAF components of the Joint Integrated Units remain functionally separate and under different chains of command. The Joint Defence Board (JDB) and JIU High Command have made progress in agreeing on priorities for integration and development, including at a workshop of SAF and SPLA JIU Commanders held in Juba from 21 to 23 May, but JDB has yet to agree on a request for international assistance to support this process.

10. In July, SPLA began the redeployment of its remaining forces in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, under verification by joint monitoring teams. SPLA asserts that some forces and heavy equipment cannot be moved immediately owing to poor road and weather conditions. Verification of the early stages of redeployment was hindered in a number of areas by non-cooperation of commanders on the ground. During the reporting period, both parties continued to restrict UNMIS movement in sector VI, which includes Abyei.

Political

11. NCP and SPLM convened high-level meetings throughout the reporting period, with the stated objective of resolving outstanding differences over the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The agenda included long-deadlocked disputes over oil contracts and the status of the Abyei area, which I have highlighted in previous reports.

12. In mid-April, the parties reported a breakthrough in negotiations over Abyei, announcing to the National Assembly that the Presidency had agreed, in principle, on an interim civil administration to be appointed for a period of six months pending final agreement on its administrative boundaries. However, this consensus later unravelled, as disputes emerged over the temporary boundaries of the interim administration. A decision from the Presidency on the Abyei issue is still awaited.

13. In the meantime, the parties announced progress on a range of other issues, mainly relating to the respective jurisdictions of the federal and southern Sudan levels of government. In June, they appeared to reach an agreement on arrangements for development of the disputed oil concession "Block 5B" in Jonglei State, for which each side had previously signed a concession with different commercial companies. However, one of the companies concerned later expressed dissatisfaction with the reported agreement, and said that it would take steps to protect the original terms of its licence.

14. Meanwhile, owing to active bilateral discussions between the parties, the Assessment and Evaluation Commission suspended its work during the month of

May but reconvened in June. The Ceasefire Political Commission met only once during the reporting period, in late July.

15. The National Assembly ended its spring session on 27 June without having received drafts of pending legislation required for implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, including bills for the national security service, the police service and the elections. In addition, the National Electoral Commission and the commissions for both human rights and for land have yet to be established. In May, some SPLM and National Democratic Alliance parliamentarians expressed dissatisfaction with the slow pace of the review of existing legislation for its compatibility with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and asked the Ministry of Justice to explain the delays.

16. In a number of areas, implementation of the Agreement is being delayed by the slow disbursement of federal funds to relevant commissions and ministries. Fiscal decentralization, stipulated by the Agreement, has yet to take full effect. In May, the Chairman of the Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission noted that states were currently receiving much less from the federal level than had been allocated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

17. In a positive development, a pilot census was finally conducted in April in advance of the national population census, covering a wide range of sample regions including locations in Darfur. Plans for the full census were delayed, however, from November 2007 to January 2008, owing to concerns about the preparedness of the Southern Census Commission, linked to slow disbursement of funds by the national Government. Of $30 million in federal funding originally requested by the Commission for 2007, only 56 per cent has been granted and only a small proportion of that amount has been disbursed. This has severely delayed mapping of the 79 southern counties, which is now further hampered by the onset of the rainy season.

18. Meanwhile, incremental progress was made on defining the demarcation of the 1 January 1956 border between northern and southern Sudan. The Technical Border Committee conducted field visits to the border regions, and Committee members visited London and Cairo to survey relevant maps available in the two capitals. The Committee has also begun to plan for an international workshop on best practice in border demarcation processes, which UNMIS intends to support. The Committee has indicated that it expects border demarcation to be conducted in the spring of 2008.

19. On 1 July, after a six-month delay, new governors were appointed for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, in line with the requirements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for the rotation of posts between the parties. However, there was no significant progress in harmonizing the parties' respective police and civil administrations in either state. In Blue Nile, the creation of an additional locality, called "Al Tadamon", sparked political protests. SPLM supporters believe the creation of the locality was an attempt to manipulate the political geography of Blue Nile State at the expense of SPLM.

20. In the meantime, the Government of Southern Sudan made progress in developing and staffing its new institutions. The President of the Government continued to reorganize the states' administrations in a bid to improve efficiency and tackle corruption. On 3 July he announced a major cabinet reshuffle, including the

appointment of several new presidential advisers. The President also appointed more than 200 legal counsellors and prosecutors. Meanwhile, the first group of human rights monitors from the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission was deployed, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) began training of police and prisons personnel with support from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund.

21. The budget shortfall facing the Government of Southern Sudan is likely to have a negative impact on many of the above activities. In May and June, payment delays related to the Government's shortage of financing triggered protests in different locations, including a teachers' strike in Rumbek. In Jonglei State, SPLA veterans blocked the main Juba-Bor road to protest their not receiving allowances. In addition, the ongoing integration of 34,000 former SSDF elements into SPLA will strain the already overstretched SPLA payroll.

22. As a countermeasure, the Ministry of Finance of the Government of Southern Sudan has sought ways to diversify non-oil revenues, including through the introduction of a new income tax bill which is currently before the Legislative Assembly. All ministries and governors have been instructed to revise their budgets downwards in order to address recent funding shortages. This, however, may hinder the efforts of the Government to put in place an effective civilian administration throughout the south.

23. On a positive note, the Southern Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission began to function as a body mandated to promote reconciliation in southern Sudan. The Commission played a role in launching the SPLM initiative on the Darfur political process, and although still lacking in organizational capacity, has engaged in preliminary efforts to take forward reconciliation between rival ethnic groups in Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei.

III. Implementation of other peace processes in the Sudan

24. In eastern Sudan, after a long period of stagnation, steps were taken to begin implementation of the 14 October 2006 Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement. Following high-level bilateral discussions in Asmara, three leaders of the Eastern Front were appointed to senior-level posts in the Government of National Unity on 25 May: one as Assistant to the President, another as Adviser to the President and the third as State Minister of Transport and Roads. In June, eight members of the Eastern Front were appointed as deputies to the National Assembly, where they will occupy seats previously allocated to NCP. Meanwhile, former combatants of the Eastern Front began assembling at Kassala for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration organized by the Government of the Sudan with the support of UNDP.

25. With regard to Darfur, the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1769 (2007) marks a major step forward in United Nations efforts to assist the Sudanese people in resolving the crisis in Darfur. Intensive preparations are ongoing to ensure that the African Union-United Nations hybrid operation is deployed as rapidly and as effectively as possible. Additional capable troops must be committed, support systems must be put in place and command structures must be established. The unequivocal and continuous support of both the Government of the Sudan and the rebel movements will be critical in this regard.

26. As we redouble our collective efforts to strengthen peacekeeping in Darfur, we must also acknowledge that it is only through a political process that we can achieve a sustainable solution to the conflict. My Special Envoy for Darfur, Jan Eliasson, and the Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the African Union for Darfur, Salim Ahmed Salim, convened a meeting of Darfur rebel groups who have not acceded to the Darfur Peace Agreement from 3 to 6 August, in Ngurdoto, near Arusha in the United Republic of Tanzania. The main objective of the Arusha meeting was to create an enabling environment for the movements to consult among themselves, with other participants, and with the United Nations and the African Union, and to facilitate the preparations for the forthcoming negotiations. All the major non-signatory movements were represented at the Arusha consultations (Justice and Equality Movement, Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance, National Movement for Reformation and Development, Sudan Liberation Movement-Unity, Sudan Liberation Movement-Abdul Shafi and Sudan Liberation Movement-Khamis), with the exception of Abdul Wahid, leader of one of the Sudan Liberation Movement factions, who boycotted the meeting. The meeting benefited from the presence not only of the political leaders of the non-signatory groups but also of some field commanders and representatives of Chad, Egypt, Eritrea and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

27. The consultations focused on five key issues: (a) a common negotiation platform of the movements for the resumed talks; (b) the criteria for, and level of participation in, the final negotiations; (c) the agenda and venue for the renewed talks; (d) inclusion of the concerns of internally displaced persons, refugees, tribal leaders, women and other civil society groups; and (e) security and humanitarian matters.

28. After two days of intensive discussions, the representatives of the various movements presented a joint paper to the Special Envoys outlining their common platform on the main agenda items for the final negotiations (wealth sharing, power sharing, security, land issues and humanitarian assistance). Considering that the movements had not been able to reach a common platform until then, the Special Envoys were impressed by their commitment to do so rapidly in Arusha.

29. At the end of the meeting, Special Envoys Eliasson and Salim consulted the movement leaders and the representatives of neighbouring countries and issued chairmen's conclusions highlighting the following key principles, which the movements had agreed to during the meeting: readiness to participate in a mediation process led by the African Union and the United Nations; preparedness to keep the platform open for others (rebel movements); readiness to respect a cessation of hostilities, provided that all other parties make similar commitments; assurances to allow unhindered humanitarian access in Darfur and to refrain from violence against the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) and humanitarian personnel; acceptance of Security Council resolution 1769 (2007) and support for its implementation; and endorsement of the inclusion of the concerns of all stakeholders (internally displaced persons, refugees, traditional leaders and women's groups) in the process of negotiations through an appropriate mechanism.

30. The movement leaders also recommended that the resumed talks should be held within two to three months from the conclusion of the Arusha talks, in "countries of the regional initiatives or at any otner location determined appropriate by the Special Envoys provided the environment and facilities were adequate".

Overall, both the chairmen's conclusions and the movements' common platform provide important benchmarks for the political process.

31. The Government of the Sudan subsequently welcomed the Arusha conclusions and reiterated a general willingness to enter into talks with the non-signatories in order to amend and augment the Darfur Peace Agreement. At the same time, it restated the Government's objection to wholesale renegotiation of the Agreement.

32. In the meantime, UNMIS continued to provide assistance to AMIS under the Light and Heavy Support Packages, as described in greater detail in my report on Darfur dated 27 July 2007 (S/2007/462). UNMIS and AMIS continue to apprise the Government of the Sudan of the details of the support packages through the Tripartite Mechanism.

33. The Government of Southern Sudan, along with my Special Envoy for the LRA-affected areas, Joaquim Chissano, continued to facilitate the peace talks between LRA and the Government of Uganda. After a five-month break, the parties resumed peace talks on 25 April and on 2 May signed an agreement on comprehensive solutions to the conflict which covers participation in national politics, security issues, the return of displaced persons and the reconstruction of war-affected areas. On 29 June, further agreement was reached on the principles of accountability for war crimes, to be addressed through a traditional justice and reconciliation mechanism. UNMIS continues to provide vital logistical support to the talks.

IV. Implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan

Political support and reconciliation

34. During the reporting period, my Acting Special Representative, Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, initiated a new mechanism for periodic high-level consultations with the parties to provide opportunities for UNMIS to discuss its priorities with NCP and SPLM, in an attempt to ensure transparency and streamline efforts regarding implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Through these high-level consultations, UNMIS intends to provide coordinated support to the parties and share with them its views on the objectives and concerns of the international community. The first of these high-level consultations is expected was held on 10 August.

35. In the transitional areas of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, UNMIS continued to work actively with politicians and local communities to promote the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and invigorate local peace initiatives. In southern Sudan, UNMIS supported the Security Committee of the South Sudan Legislative Assembly in its efforts to resolve the Mundari-Bari and the Toposa-Didinga tribal conflicts by addressing land and resource issues. In Jonglei State, UNMIS staff worked with the administration and tribal leaders to address tension between the Murle tribe and its neighbours, as violent cattle raiding prompted calls from the community for immediate forcible disarmament of the Murle.

United Nations military deployment and activities

36. As at 17 July 2007, 97 per cent of the mandated UNMIS military personnel (9,415 of a total of 9,706) were deployed, including 591 United Nations military observers, 280 staff officers and 8,544 troops.

37. The reporting period saw enhanced monitoring and verification activity as the Mission's military component worked with the parties to support the redeployment of SAF in advance of the 9 July 2007 deadline. The Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, headed by the UNMIS Force Commander, met eight times to monitor progress, resolve disputes and help the parties consolidate trust and confidence. The Committee continued to provide an effective forum for keeping the process on track. Area Joint Military Committees also met regularly in each of the six sectors. In addition, United Nations military observers and the parties' national monitors conducted hundreds of joint monitoring patrols, accounting for military movements and verifying forces assigned to Joint Integrated Units. However, full verification in some areas was complicated by limitations of logistics and terrain, while in others the lack of cooperation by the parties or political sensitivities precluded progress.

38. As the parties move towards full implementation of the security protocol, the monitoring and verification of their forces on the ground remains vital to the building of trust as the parties make the transition from war to peace. Full implementation of the security arrangements mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement — including redeployment, the Joint Integrated Units' assumption of their mandate to protect the oilfields, the integration and demobilization of other armed groups and the gradual downsizing of the parties' armed forces — is a key element of the vital first phase of peace consolidation, which will pave the way for the wider stabilization of the Sudan.

39. In the early part of the reporting period, there was a spike in violence in sectors I and III and in the transitional areas. UNMIS military contingents intensified their patrolling and ceasefire investigations to help improve security and build confidence among the local population. However, in some areas, such activity was hampered by restrictions imposed on the movement of United Nations monitors. Allegations of activity by other armed groups in UNMIS sector VI (which includes Abyei and borders Darfur) could not be verified owing to continued restrictions on the movement of United Nations military observers across the sector by both parties.

40. In view of local logistical constraints, the Mission also revised earlier plans to establish team sites at Raja (Western Bahr el Ghazal) and Baw (Blue Nile). A more visible UNMIS presence in these areas will be achieved by intensified patrolling and use of temporary operating bases. In addition, as mentioned above, the arrival of the rainy season in southern Sudan, making many roads impassable, is already having an impact on military operations. The UNMIS riverine unit stationed in Malakal suffered considerable storm damage during the reporting period, and on 10 May a major tornado wrought substantial destruction at sector IV headquarters in Kadugli.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

41. The coordination of a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process gained momentum during the reporting period with the convening of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Coordination Council and

the establishment of a national technical subcommittee. UNMIS is providing technical assistance to the subcommittee, which oversees the drafting of a national strategic framework for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. However, UNMIS has no formal relationship with the National Council, which impedes policy dialogue between the United Nations and the national body as well as planning related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in both the north and south. In order to support the process in the Sudan efficiently, there is a need for UNMIS and the donor community to understand the National Council's policy guidance on key issues, such as the eligibility criteria for entry into the programme and implementation arrangements in the transitional areas. In addition, several critical issues need to be urgently considered by the Council, in particular the Sudanese Armed Forces' unilateral disarmament and discharge of members of other armed groups in Upper Nile, Western Bahr el Ghazal and across Eastern Equatoria. This unilateral disarmament and discharge process remains a source of concern as it is not part of the formal disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.

42. Meanwhile, preparations are under way for the voluntary disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State. SAF and the northern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission have pre-registered 25,000 combatants for this process, and the demobilization of a first group of some 13,000 is expected to begin as soon as a national strategy is ready. UNMIS will monitor compliance with agreed standards for personnel and weapon verification and will also provide reinsertion assistance. SPLA also submitted a list of some 25,000 pre-registered candidates for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. However, owing to the late start of the programme, the respective target caseloads for 2006/07 have been rolled over to 2007/08.

43. UNMIS, UNDP and partners continued to coordinate and support Southern Sudan's voluntary civilian disarmament initiative in Jonglei State. Some 1,200 light weapons have been collected there so far, and efforts for the demobilization of children are ongoing. In northern Sudan, 25 children were demobilized and reunited with their families, while in southern Sudan over 250 demobilized children are participating in reintegration programmes.

Electoral assistance

44. UNMIS continued to monitor progress in developing the draft elections law and related legislative developments. Stakeholders, including political parties and civil society, presented further submissions to the National Constitutional Review Commission on the draft law, which is expected to be tabled in the October session of the National Assembly. The UNMIS electoral task force continued to track developments on the census and to engage with international partners on planning for electoral assistance activities. The Mission has initiated measures to establish electoral capacity in southern Sudan within the next few months, including through the establishment of the Juba regional office, to be followed by expansion into the sectors. Capacity will also be strengthened at UNMIS headquarters in order to be prepared for the run-up to elections, subsequent to the enactment of the elections law and establishment of the national elections commission.

Police

45. As at 9 July 2007, UNMIS had deployed 686 police advisers, representing 96 per cent of the authorized strength. In a significant development, the Mission began delivery of the new United Nations police training assistance package in southern Sudan, designed to improve local capacity and compliance with principles of democratic policing and international best practices. The package focuses on basic police skills and on special training in crisis response, which will strengthen the credibility of the police as an alternative to the military in maintaining law and order. United Nations police conducted the first crisis response training in Juba in June 2007; a first group of 29 officers has graduated and is expected to form the nucleus of a local formed police unit in Juba. Meanwhile, five northern states have also requested United Nations police training support.

46. In addition, United Nations police continue to promote community policing practices in all sectors and to monitor and address human rights abuses by the police, particularly in the area of unlawful detention. During the reporting period, the new gender and child protection and special investigation units of the United Nations police component intervened to secure the release of 75 persons unlawfully held in local police and prison custody.

47. United Nations police also continued to advise the Southern Sudan Police Service on strategic development, including on command and communications structures. United Nations officers are now co-located with local police at six out of 10 State commands and at 36 local stations. During the reporting period, a registration database and identity card scheme for the Southern Sudan Police Service, established by UNMIS, was transferred to the control of the Service. This will aid them in planning and in the effective management of authorized officers.

48. Meanwhile, UNMIS continued to promote community policing in camps for internally displaced persons, completing a fifth workshop at the Al Baraka camp near Khartoum which resulted in the establishment of a local joint action programme for community policing with relevant stakeholders. The Mission also provided community policing training for national police officers from Darfur to enable them to initiate their own projects on return to the region.

Human rights

49. UNMIS continued to promote the urgent establishment of the human rights institutions mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in cooperation with Government officials and representatives of civil society. In this context, UNMIS organized two preparatory workshops on the structure and competencies of the projected national human rights commission. In the south, the Mission continued to assist the Southern Sudan Human Rights Commission by providing two short-term technical advisers who are to train the newly selected southern Sudanese human rights monitors.

50. In Khartoum, the UNMIS human rights component closely coordinated with the National Assembly's human rights committee in organizing a workshop on harmonizing existing laws with international human rights standards. Following the suspension of Al-Sudani newspaper and the detention of two journalists in violation of the right to freedom of expression, UNMIS monitored and attended court hearings while at the same time advocating for the adoption of the draft law on press

and publications to grant greater freedom of the press. While UNMIS worked towards strengthening cooperation and information-sharing with the Khartoum State police, it continued to closely monitor developments affecting internally displaced persons in camps, including recent police raids on the Mayo and Soba camps located near Khartoum.

51. In this context, UNMIS has engaged an international expert on human rights training for police forces, who will help to develop a comprehensive strategy and manual on human rights training for national police forces. Meanwhile, UNMIS staff delivered human rights and rule of law training for police, prosecutors and legal advisers newly appointed in southern Sudan.

Rule of law

52. In Khartoum, on 10 May, the Government, UNMIS and UNDP signed a memorandum of understanding relating to the reform of the prison system in the Sudan. A prison development committee will now be established, and the Government has requested that 15 international corrections officers be deployed across the Sudan to provide technical assistance. Twenty-five advisers are already being placed in prisons in southern Sudan. In Juba, training began for 532 ex-SPLA soldiers assigned to the Southern Sudan Prison Service. Through UNMIS facilitation, a group of new southern Sudan prison personnel are being trained in prison management in Kenya.

53. However, across southern Sudan, the shortage of infrastructure and facilities for the courts continues to hinder judicial activities. Prosecutors and judges have no office space or staff support to sustain a functioning court system. In addition, the interface between customary law courts and statutory courts remains a contentious issue pending the adoption of relevant legislation.

Public information

54. UNMIS radio (Radio Miraya-FM) continues to expand its broadcast network into remote areas of the south. Work is ongoing to build repeater stations in Torit, Yambio and Maridi in Western and Eastern Equatoria. Miraya journalists are now permanently based in Malakal, Wau and Rumbek. Miraya-FM broadcasts on a dedicated internet site can also be heard by audiences, including the Sudanese diaspora. Negotiations with the Government to secure approval for UNMIS to broadcast in the north continue. Miraya-FM is closely cooperating with AMIS in preparing weekly programmes and public service announcements which are broadcast by state radio stations in Nyala, Geneina and El Fasher. UNMIS also holds regular weekly press briefings, including presentations on activities by substantive units and members of the United Nations country team. In the south and transitional areas, the Mission continues to reach out to the community with workshops on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the role of UNMIS.

Humanitarian assistance

55. By June, the United Nations and partners workplan for Sudan was 62 per cent funded, with some $780 million pledged towards the total of $1.26 billion in humanitarian requirements for 2007. Funding for food aid, which represents just over half of the total workplan, was particularly strong, whereas other sectors

including basic infrastructure, health and support for returns remain significantly underfunded.

56. The second instalment of $45 million from the 2007 Common Humanitarian Fund was allocated in early April. In southern Sudan, $10 million was divided between Warrap, Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Upper Nile and Northern Bahr el Ghazal — five states which are prime destinations of the majority of internally displaced persons and refugees returning to their areas of origin in southern Sudan, but are generally underserved in terms of basic social services and key sectors. Meanwhile, United Nations agencies and implementing partners have nearly completed the distribution of vital seeds and tools to target beneficiaries in southern Sudan, mainly returnees from the north. Some 82 per cent of the targeted beneficiaries have received agricultural inputs and started planting.

57. In Darfur, the humanitarian situation and operations continued to be characterized by forced movement of civilians, increasing the number of internally displaced persons to 2.2 million and raising the level of tensions in camps. All in all, while a major humanitarian crisis is being averted, providing humanitarian assistance in Darfur continues to be an uphill struggle with decreasing assets and staff available to maintain the aid operations. There are now 12,300 aid workers active in Darfur. Access to populations in need has dropped from 78 per cent to 68 per cent during the reporting period, owing largely to security concerns arising from an increase in banditry. At the same time, the caseload of conflict-affected populations has increased by more than half a million, to 4.2 million people, which is an increase of 15 per cent.

Protection of civilians

58. UNMIS continues to monitor and work with relevant actors to address issues of civilian security. The Mission and agency partners succeeded in obtaining the agreement of the Khartoum State government to a set of guiding principles for the relocation of displaced persons, which will open the door to addressing the shelter needs of this vulnerable population.

59. In southern Sudan, the activities of some regular armed forces and local militias, the exploitation of oil resources and tribal insecurity continue to pose challenges for the protection of civilians. In Eastern Equatoria, UNMIS facilitated the investigation into the killing of over 50 women and children in Lauro following the eruption of violence mentioned in paragraph 3 above. In Unity State, an UNMIS assessment mission observed serious problems associated with oil development, including lack of consultation and failure to compensate communities for environmental damage and loss of land. In particular, new roads have changed water courses and have adversely affected grazing and farming. UNMIS continues to advocate for respect of the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which calls for natural resources to be developed with regard for sustainable development and with due consultation and compensation for affected individuals and communities.

60. Across the Sudan, UNMIS, in coordination with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), continues to monitor and advocate for the release of children associated with armed groups. As a result of efforts by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, UNICEF and UNMIS, Sudan Liberation Army leader and Presidential Assistant Minni Minawi agreed to

release minors associated with his forces. Another breakthrough occurred in Unity State, southern Sudan, when 26 boys affiliated with SPLA were demobilized in May. However, it is estimated that thousands of children still remain to be demobilized.

Returns

61. The current return season saw a dramatic increase in the number of organized returns compared to 2006. Some 85,000 internally displaced persons and refugees have been transported back to their homes by the United Nations as part of the joint plan agreed between the national and Southern Sudan authorities and the United Nations. The main areas of return have been Central Equatoria, Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Blue Nile. With the onset of the rains, return operations have decreased but will continue, utilizing road networks that remain open from Kenya and Uganda as well as air and river corridors to otherwise inaccessible areas. As expected, the rate of spontaneous returnees has decreased this quarter as more people take advantage of organized transport provided by the United Nations. This description of returns does not cover Darfur, which is dealt with in my separate reports to the Council.

Mine action

62. UNMIS mine action teams continued to make good progress during the final weeks of the dry season. Of 2,080 dangerous areas identified in 2003, 814 have been cleared. During the reporting period, UNMIS also began work to assess the needs of mine survivors and mine-affected communities in southern Sudan. UNMIS and UNICEF continue to provide mine-risk education to people living in or returning to affected areas, as well as to all incoming United Nations personnel.

63. During the reporting period, the National Mine Action Centre opened an office in Kassala, while the Southern Sudan De-mining Commission has been establishing regional offices in Yei and Malakal. These are positive steps towards the development of a self-sustaining indigenous mine action capacity in the Sudan that will be able to tackle the problems associated with landmines and explosive remnants of war after the departure of UNMIS.

Economic recovery and reconstruction

64. The March 2007 Sudan Consortium identified three tasks to be completed before the next meeting of donors in October: a detailed review of the Joint Assessment Mission and plans for the 2008-2011 phase, to be fully integrated with the planning of the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan; establishment of a Government of National Unity-Government of Southern Sudan task force to review and address constraints to aid delivery; and preparations for the October Consortium, including a review of the Consortium's mandate. During the reporting period, the Government of National Unity established a high-level committee to pursue these recommendations, including representatives of the World Bank, the United Nations and donors. Field visits by the committee are under way in northern Sudan, assessing challenges to aid delivery.

65. Proposals for creating a second window to the multi-donor trust funds were officially presented to the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan in May 2007. Initial indications reflect that the two Governments view the proposal positively; however, they are yet to provide a formal response.

Gender

66. During the reporting period, UNMIS partnered with the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Child Affairs to formulate a workplan for the implementation of the Sudan's national policy for women's empowerment. The policy covers six thematic areas derived from the Millennium Development Goals and the Beijing Platform for Action. In addition, the Mission's gender unit continued to provide technical support and capacity-building to other government institutions at national and state levels, focused on the prevention of gender-based violence and recognition of women's role in peacebuilding. Internally, UNMIS continued to ensure gender awareness within the military, police and civilian components of the Mission.

HIV/AIDS

67. UNMIS maintained its training of peer educators and HIV/AIDS counsellors, including a new initiative for training by HIV/AIDS regional committees. A total of 503 peer educators had been trained by the end of June. In addition, over 20,000 members of the armed forces, police and general public across the Sudan received HIV/AIDS sensitization training. In a special initiative with UNDP and the southern Sudan authorities, 39 HIV/AIDS local counsellors were trained to support SPLA and the Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission.

Conduct and discipline

68. During the reporting period, some 30 allegations of misconduct in UNMIS were reported, including two allegations of serious misconduct which were referred to the Office of Internal Oversight Services. One allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse, published by a local newspaper in Wau (sector II), was found to be false and was officially retracted. The Mission continued to work actively with staff members and in the local community to raise awareness of conduct and discipline issues and my policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse.

V. Observations

69. In this progress report, I had hoped to be able to inform the Security Council of the completion of redeployment by the Sudanese Armed Forces out of southern Sudan, and to register this as a major achievement of the parties. Regrettably, despite some hard work by all concerned and frequent assurances by the Government of its commitment, the 9 July 2007 deadline has not been fully met. I call upon SAF immediately to remove all remaining regular military elements from southern Sudan, with the exception of those earmarked for Joint Integration Units. I welcome recent progress in the Ceasefire Political Commission to establish timelines and mechanisms for resolving the status of voluntarily demobilized troops and trust that these arrangements will be implemented without delay. Meanwhile, UNMIS will continue its efforts to complete full verification of the redeployment, which requires the cooperation of the parties.

70. While redeployment is a major stepping stone towards full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement's security protocol, several other elements of this key agreement still need to be pursued in earnest by both parties in the months ahead, and closely monitored and verified by UNMIS, as mandated in resolution 1590 (2005).

71. As I previously stressed to the Council, the development of the Joint Integration Units remains an issue of central importance. According to the timelines provided in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the formation of these units is a prerequisite for full redeployment of SPLA forces from Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. The Joint Integration Units are also mandated to protect the Sudan's oilfields, while oil installations themselves are to be demilitarized under the Agreement. Given the importance of this process, I strongly urge the parties to complete the assignment of troops to the Joint Integration Units, which is already some nine months overdue. In the meantime, the efforts of the Joint Defence Board and the Unit leaders to develop plans for integration and training of the Units are welcome, and UNMIS stands ready to assist in this process. In this context, I also encourage Member States concerned to consider what assistance they may be able to provide to establish effective Joint Integration Units.

72. Another key issue facing the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is the reintegration of former members of other armed groups. I welcome the recent progress made by both parties in this area. The formal dissolution of the Southern Sudan Defence Force and the incorporation of its members into SPLA or their absorption into disarmament programmes is a positive step. Declarations of incorporation or demobilization, however, must be followed up by transparent action. The parties should be encouraged to continue cooperation on this issue and ensure that the process is indeed completed, with a view to achieving comprehensive peace and stability.

73. These concerns, together with the uncertainty about the status of Abyei, agreement on the 1 January 1956 boundary and management of the oil sector, will be key issues for the parties and the United Nations to deal with in the coming months. Indeed, Abyei needs to become a real "bridge between north and south", as envisaged in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In this regard, the parties will have to establish a functioning interim executive as provided for in the Agreement, and resolve their differences on the boundary issue as soon as possible. For this reason, I have assured the parties that I will make available to them United Nations expertise and/or mediation support, if they believe this would help their discussions. Once again, I strongly urge them to lift all restrictions they have imposed on the movement of UNMIS personnel in the area around Abyei.

74. I welcome the progress in the efforts to resolve outstanding disputes over wealth sharing, particularly in the face of budgetary pressure over falling oil revenues. The parties are expected to cooperate in the sharing of resources, as provided for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and in particular to make good use of the Stabilization Fund, in order to minimize the impact which future oil price fluctuations might have on national revenue. I appeal to the parties to continue close cooperation aimed at achieving a transparent regime for the management and sustainable development of oil resources, and to protect the population from the negative effects of resource exploitation.

75. The international community expects the parties to support the early technical demarcation of the 1 January 1956 border between the north and the south, which should be based on the principles agreed by the NCP and the SPLM and informed by due consultation with local communities, as well as best international practice. In the meantime, the United Nations is taking steps to provide expertise to the Technical Border Committee in support of this important process.

76. The intensive contacts and negotiations by the parties in their joint executive institutions are a welcome reaffirmation of their commitment to address critical issues related to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, to strengthen partnership and to overcome mistrust. The two parties should be congratulated on the progress they have made, but be mindful that the real value of the results of negotiations will be in their implementation on the ground. Meanwhile, every effort should be made to use the institutions created by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in particular the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, to ensure that all key matters are addressed and disagreements resolved.

77. With regard to elections, the pace of their preparation has so far been disappointing, and both parties have to accelerate work dramatically on the necessary legislative reforms. UNMIS remains ready to assist in that effort.

78. In southern Sudan, the Government of Southern Sudan is making commendable efforts to transform wartime structures into a civilian administration capable of building long-term peace. However, daunting challenges in this crucial area remain. Civilian structures, including the police and judiciary, continue to be weak, mainly because of scarcity of resources and capacity. In this context, I urge both the Government of Southern Sudan and donors to expand and accelerate the training and development of the Southern Sudan Police Service.

79. Law and order aspects also remain a major pillar of a broader social transformation challenge. To achieve stability, the Government of Southern Sudan needs to tackle fundamental issues of land and natural resources, manage its relationship with traditional authorities and facilitate reconciliation among tribes and factions in southern society. Donors are encouraged to seek additional ways to support the south in these major challenges, including through the provision of financial or technical assistance to the Southern Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission.

80. With the completion of SAF redeployment, the focus of Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation efforts will naturally turn to the required redeployment of SPLA from Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. I welcome the recent moves by SPLA to begin this process and urge it to take forward redeployment in a timely manner, with monitoring and verification conducted through the Ceasefire Joint Military Commission. At the same time, I strongly encourage the civilian authorities of both parties in the transitional areas to support the process through the integration of administrations stipulated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

81. In recent months, the parties have made welcome progress in supporting the return of refugees and displaced persons, and in planning for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. These are two essential components of the search for durable peace in the Sudan. I urge both signatories of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to rapidly complete the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration strategy, and hope that the international community will promptly identify funding to support implementation, including plans for the reintegration of ex-combatants. I welcome the excellent cooperation between the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan related to the return of the displaced, facilitated by the United Nations, and encourage the parties to continue their joint efforts. While work to meet return targets continues, there is also a pressing need to ensure that returns are sustainable. The reintegration and rehabilitation of war-affected communities, a key principle of the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement, will require sustained support by both parties and the international community.

82. In conclusion, I wish to express my gratitude to all United Nations personnel working in the Sudan for their sacrifices and determined effort to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and to end the devastating conflict in Darfur. I am also appreciative of the efforts of the African Union — with whom the United Nations is cooperating very closely — as well as the invaluable assistance provided by many Member States, including donors and troop- and police-contributing countries.

Annex

Military and police component as at 17 July 2007

Country	Military component								Civilian police	
	Observers		Staff officers		Troops		Military subtotal			
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Argentina	6	—	7	2			13	2	11	—
Australia	20	—	34	—	1 523	—	1 577	—	8	2
Bangladesh	5	—					5	—	32	—
Belgium	6	—					6	—		
Benin	15	—	1	—			16	—		
Bolivia										
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5	—					5	—	2	—
Botswana	24	—					24	—	3	—
Brazil	6	—					6	—		
Burkina Faso	8	—	1	—	135	—	144	—		
Cambodia	24	—	7	1			31	1	2	1
Canada	14	—	8	—	424	11	446	11	8	—
China			5	—			5	—		
Croatia	10	—	6	—			16	—	1	—
Denmark	20	—					20	—		
Ecuador	18	—	21	—	781	15	820	15	7	—
Egypt	5	—					5	—	3	2
El Salvador	7	—					7	—	4	3
Fiji			1	—			1	—	2	—
Finland	8	—					8	—		
Gabon			1	—			1	—	19	1
Gambia	35	—	5	—			40	—	4	—
Germany			3	—			3	—	40	4
Ghana	4	—	2	—			6	—		
Greece	8	—	1	—			9	—		
Guatemala	5	—					5	—		
Guinea	18	—	28	—	2 575	4	2 621	4	19	2
India	10	—					10	—	1	—
Indonesia									5	4
Jamaica	12	—	10	—			22	—	21	2
Jordan	6	1	11	—	775	45	792	46	18	2
Kenya	8	—					8	—	2	—
Kyrgyzstan	6	—	1	—			7	—		
Malawi										

Country	Military component									
	Observers		Staff officers		Troops		Military subtotal		Civilian police	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Malaysia	8	—	4	—			12	—	11	—
Mali	5	—					5	—		
Moldova	2	—					2	—		
Mongolia	2	—					2	—		
Mozambique	1	—					1	—		
Namibia	7	2					7	2	1	—
Nepal	6	2	7	—			13	2	58	1
Netherlands	14	—	4	—			18	—	8	1
New Zealand	2	—					2	—		
Niger			1	—			1	—		
Nigeria	13	1	7	1			20	2	47	4
Norway	13	—	12	2			25	2	6	—
Pakistan	19	—	29	—	1 539	—	1 587	—	40	2
Paraguay	10	—					10	—		
Peru	17	—					17	—		
Philippines	13	—					13	—	52	1
Poland	2	—					2	—		
Republic of Korea	7	—	1	—			8	—		
Romania	12	—					12	—		
Russian Federation	12	—	3	—	120	—	135	—	11	—
Rwanda	15	—	8	—	253	—	276	—	21	—
Samoa									15	—
Senegal			5	—			5	—		
South Africa			4	—			4	—		
Sri Lanka	3	—					3	—	23	1
Sweden	3	—	3	—			6	—	12	2
United Republic of Tanzania	15	—	6	—			21	—	1	—
Thailand	12	—	2	—			14	—		
Turkey			3	—			3	—	14	—
Uganda	8	1					8	1	11	3
Ukraine	6	—					6	—	13	—
United Kingdom			4	—			4	—	1	—
United States									8	2
Uruguay									2	—

	Military component									
	Observers		*Staff officers*		*Troops*		*Military subtotal*		*Civilian police*	
Country	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*
Yemen	16	—	4	—			20	—	3	—
Zambia	12	2	13	—	328	16	353	18	15	3
Zimbabwe	12	2		—			12	2	22	9
Total per gender	**580**	**11**	**274**	**6**	**8 453**	**91**	**9 306**	**108**	**606**	**50**
Total	**591**		**280**		**8 544**		**9 414**		**656**	



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Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2007/501

Security Council

Distr.: General
20 August 2007

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions concerning the situation in Somalia, in particular resolution 733 (1992), resolution 1356 (2001), resolution 1425 (2002), resolution 1725 (2006) and resolution 1744 (2007), the statements of its President, in particular those of 13 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/31), 22 December 2006 (S/PRST/2006/59), 30 April 2007 (S/PRST/2007/13) and 14 June 2007 (S/PRST/2007/19),

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia,

Reiterating its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia through the Transitional Federal Charter, and stressing the importance of broad-based and representative institutions reached through an all-inclusive political process, as envisaged in the Transitional Federal Charter,

Reiterating its strong support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. François Fall,

Reiterating its appreciation of the efforts of the international community, in particular the African Union, as well as the League of Arab States, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the European Union, to promote peace, stability and reconciliation in Somalia, and *welcoming* their continued engagement,

Welcoming the communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Council of 18 July 2007, which states that the African Union will extend the mandate of its mission to Somalia (AMISOM) for an additional six months, and *noting* that the communiqué calls for the United Nations to deploy a peacekeeping operation to Somalia that will support the long-term stabilization and post-conflict restoration in the country,

Taking note of the letter of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission dated 4 August 2007 to the Secretary-General (S/2007/499), which requested that experts from the African Union Commission and the United Nations Secretariat meet as soon as possible to discuss what further support might be provided to AMISOM,

Taking note of the Secretary-General's report on Somalia of 25 June 2007 (S/2007/381), in particular paragraph 30 on the deployment of a team of 10 military, police, and civilian experts to African Union headquarters to support its mission planning and management capacity structure, and *expressing* its appreciation for this support of AMISOM,

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Recalling that cooperation between the United Nations and the regional arrangements in matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security, as are appropriate for regional action, is an integral part of collective security as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations,

Taking note of paragraph 27 of the Secretary-General's report referred to above communicating the offer of the International Contact Group of its "Good Offices" to facilitate the process of genuine political reconciliation in Somalia, and *encouraging* the International Contact Group to continue the implementation of this offer,

Reiterating its support for Somalia's Transitional Federal Institutions, *underlining* the importance of providing and maintaining stability and security throughout Somalia, and *underscoring* the importance of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militia and ex-combatants in Somalia,

Condemning all acts of violence and extremism inside Somalia, and *expressing* its concern regarding the continued violence inside Somalia,

Stressing its concern at the upsurge in piracy off the Somali coast described in paragraph 51 of the Secretary-General's report, and *taking note* of the joint communiqué of the International Maritime Organization and the World Food Programme of 10 July 2007,

Emphasizing the contribution that AMISOM and its Ugandan contingents are making to lasting peace and stability in Somalia, *condemning* any hostility towards them, and *urging* all parties in Somalia and the region to support and cooperate with AMISOM,

Underlining that the full deployment of AMISOM will help avoid a security vacuum and help create the conditions for full withdrawal of other foreign forces from Somalia,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Stresses* the need for broad-based and representative institutions reached through an all-inclusive political process in Somalia, as envisaged in the Transitional Federal Charter, in order to consolidate stability, peace and reconciliation in the country and to ensure that international assistance is as effective as possible;

2. *Welcomes* the convening of the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC) at the initiative of the Transitional Federal Institutions, and *urges* all parties to support the NRC and participate in the political process;

3. *Stresses* the need for the NRC to be an all-inclusive intra-Somali political process involving all stakeholders including all political leaders, clan leaders, religious leaders, the business community, and representatives of civil society such as women's groups;

4. *Urges* the Transitional Federal Institutions and all parties in Somalia to respect the conclusions of the NRC and to sustain an equally inclusive ongoing

political process thereafter, and *encourages* them to unite behind the efforts to promote such an inclusive dialogue;

5. *Reiterates* the need for the ongoing political process to both agree on a comprehensive and lasting cessation of hostilities and to produce a road map for a comprehensive peace process, including democratic elections at the local, regional and national levels as set out in Somalia's Transitional Federal Charter;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue and intensify his efforts to strengthen the NRC and, more widely, promote an ongoing all-inclusive political process, including by assisting the Transitional Federal Institutions' role in delivering both and by working together with the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the European Union, and the International Contact Group on Somalia, and *requests* the Secretary-General to report, pursuant to the timetable set out in paragraph 17 below, on the efforts of the Transitional Federal Institutions, on progress made in the NRC and the subsequent political process, and on any obstacles to the success of either;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide in the same reports an assessment of further measures that may be required to strengthen the ability of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) to fulfil the role envisaged in paragraph 6 above, including the possibility of relocation from Nairobi to Mogadishu and any security measures that might be necessary for such a move;

8. *States its intention*, following the Secretary-General's reports referred to in paragraph 6 above, to take measures against those who seek to prevent or block the NRC or a peaceful political process, or those who threaten the Transitional Federal Institutions or AMISOM by force, or take action that undermines stability in Somalia or the region;

9. *Decides* to authorize member States of the African Union to maintain a mission in Somalia for a further period of six months, which shall be authorized to take all necessary measures as appropriate to carry out the following mandate:

(a) To support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia by assisting with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved with the process referred to in paragraphs 1 to 5;

(b) To provide, as appropriate, protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions to help them carry out their functions of government, and security for key infrastructure;

(c) To assist, within its capabilities, and in coordination with other parties, with implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan, in particular the effective re-establishment and training of all-inclusive Somali security forces;

(d) To contribute, as may be requested and within capabilities, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance;

(e) To protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel;

10. *Urges* member States of the African Union to contribute to the above mission in order to help create the conditions for the withdrawal of all other foreign forces from Somalia;

11. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) shall not apply to:

(a) Supplies of weapons and military equipment, technical training and assistance intended solely for the support of or use by the mission referred to in paragraph 9 above; or

(b) Such supplies and technical assistance by States intended solely for the purpose of helping develop security sector institutions, consistent with the political process set out in paragraphs 1 to 5 above and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) within five working days of receiving the notification described in paragraph 12 below;

12. *Decides* that States providing supplies or technical assistance in accordance with paragraph 11 (b) above shall notify the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) in advance and on a case-by-case basis;

13. *Emphasizes* the continued contribution made to Somalia's peace and security by the arms embargo, *demands* that all Member States, in particular those of the region, fully comply with it, *reiterates* its intention to consider urgently ways to strengthen its effectiveness, including through targeted measures in support of the arms embargo, and *requests* that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) report to the Council within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on possible measures that might be taken and how they might be implemented;

14. *Urges* Member States to provide financial resources, personnel, equipment and services for the full deployment of AMISOM;

15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consult with the African Union Commission on what further support might be provided to AMISOM and report back to the Council on any progress, pursuant to the timetable set out in paragraph 17 below;

16. *Requests* the Secretary-General, further to the observations in his report on Somalia of 25 June 2007 referred to above, to continue to develop the existing contingency planning for the possible deployment of a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation replacing AMISOM including:

(a) Sending a further Technical Assessment Mission to the region as soon as possible;

(b) Further contact with potential troop-contributing countries;

(c) Identifying what further action the United Nations and the international community should take to help create the conditions necessary for, and to overcome potential obstacles to, the deployment and success of a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Somalia, including specifying measures, indicators and time frames for review of progress that will assist the Security Council's decision on the appropriateness of and objectives for a United Nations mission;

17. *Requests* that the Secretary-General report to the Council within 30 days after the adoption of this resolution, and then again within a further 30 days, on the status of the further development of the plans outlined in paragraph 16 above, as well as the political aspects in paragraphs 6 and 7 above;

18. *Encourages* Member States whose naval vessels and military aircraft operate in international waters and airspace adjacent to the coast of Somalia to be vigilant to any incident of piracy therein and to take appropriate action to protect merchant shipping, in particular the transportation of humanitarian aid, against any such act, in line with relevant international law;

19. *Reaffirms* its previous resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, and 1674 (2006) and 1738 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and *stresses* the responsibility of all parties and armed groups in Somalia to take appropriate steps to protect the civilian population in the country, consistent with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, in particular by avoiding any indiscriminate attacks on populated areas;

20. *Strongly supports and encourages* the ongoing relief efforts in Somalia, *recalls* its resolution 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, *calls on* all parties and armed groups in Somalia to take appropriate steps to ensure the safety and security of AMISOM and humanitarian personnel, and grant timely, safe and unhindered access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all those in need, and *urges* the countries in the region to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance by land or via air and sea ports;

21. *Reaffirms* its previous resolution 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict and *recalls* the subsequent conclusions of the Security Council Working Group on Children in Armed Conflict pertaining to parties to the armed conflict in Somalia (S/AC.51/2007/14);

22. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.